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IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding and a When-Issued Market

Stomper, Alex; Aussenegg, Wolfgang; Pichler, Pegaret - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper examines the German IPO pricing process which combines bookbuilding with a liquid pre-IPO when-issued market … bookbuilding provides information for IPO pricing, beyond the information that is required to set preliminary price ranges. Once …, the evidence suggests that such trading does not fully supplant information gathering through bookbuilding. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990042

Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets

Stomper, Alex; Pichler, Pegaret - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We develop a model that allows for the coexistence of bookbuilding and when-issued trading. We show that, due to …-issued trading may interfere with information gathering thorough bookbuilding, in the case that informative bookbuilding is not … needed. However, informative bookbuilding may be a prerequisite for the when-issued market to function. In this case the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990048

What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government’s choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781

Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly

Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The seller’s problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller’s problem can always be found in an extreme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489607

On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502099

Merger Mechanisms

Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148