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Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942
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Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao-Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230821
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Multiple Membership and Federal Sructures
Savvateev, Alexei; Breton, Michel Le; Makarov, Valery; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
We consider a model of the “world" with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965210
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Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market
Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008033
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Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
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Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430
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Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of … subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin
Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423099