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The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network

Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329

Repeated Games Played in a Network

Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068

Civic Capital and the Size Distribution of Plants: Short-Run Dynamics and Long-Run Equilibrium

Bürker, Matthias; Minerva, G. Alfredo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

We characterize how the size distribution of plants, within narrowly defined industries, changed in Italy over a ten-year time span, and relate this to the stock of civic capital at the provincial level. Data on plant size come from the 1991 and 2001 Italian censuses. Civic capital turns out to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904924

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks … for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of … the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Sustainable Cooperation in Global Climate Policy: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets to Build on Copenhagen and Cancun

Bosetti, Valentina; Frankel, Jeffrey - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320996

Punish and Perish?

Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social … the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors …, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321000

Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008019

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

Noailly, Joëlle; Withagen, Cees A.; Bergh, Jeroen … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423138