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Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game

Deissenberg, Christophe; Dawid, Herbert; Sevcik, Pavel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423072

Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423217

Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds

Jackson, Matthew O.; Golub, Benjamin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naïvely update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423267

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385381

Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923

Controlling for Biases in Primary Valuation Studies: A Meta-analysis of International Coral Reef Values

Abdullah, Sabah; Rosenberger, Randall S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

et al. (2007) but considering some stated preference biases and/or effects. The present meta-analysis uses twice the … number of observations as the previous one and sheds more light in understanding the influence of these common biases and …/or effects found in valuations. The results show the common biases/effects in varied methodology types significantly influence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603762

Bias and Efficiency of Single vs Double Bound Models for Contingent Valuation Studies.A Monte Carlo Analysis

Calia, Pinuccia; Strazzera, Elisabetta - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

former is easier to implement, while the latter is known to be more efficient. We analyse the bias of the ML estimates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423136

The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531

Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements

Dietz, Simon; Marchiori, Carmen; Tavoni, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904936