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Corruption and the Curse: The Dictator’s Choice

Sarr, Mare; Swanson, Tim - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of a self-interested and unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the exploitation of a resource-rich country. This dictator makes the recursive choice between either investing domestically to live off the productivity of the country while facing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833900

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

Caparrós, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570304

Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms

Ilkiliç, Rahmi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008039

Network of Commons

Ilkiliç, Rahmi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423231

Strategic Network Interdiction

Hong, Sunghoon - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131109

Social Conformity in Games with Many Players

Wooders, Myrna; Cartwright, Edward; Selten, Reinhard - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230911

Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230917

Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks

Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

single link towards a weak agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of the other agents, each bilateral bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918

Intermediation in Networks

Siedlarek, Jan-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

This paper studies bargaining and exchange in a networked market with intermediation. Possibilities to trade are … different feasible routes. Using a stochastic model of bargaining, I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed … efficient. The inefficiency arises from a hold-up threat and the inability of bargaining parties credibly to commit to a split …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555589

Bargaining and Power

Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak … conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power configuration which is stable with respect to renegotiations. We further … different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942