Showing 1 - 10 of 117
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474
Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541202
coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541206
This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences in different economic systems. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents responding to economic incentives and transmitting their ideology...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320986
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068
This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its “social capital” by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423105
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423198
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230918
Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relationships, including the antagonistic ones. In this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network, simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbors....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833896
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833931