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Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition

Fontini, Fulvio; Millock, Katrin; Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

In many cases consumers cannot observe firms’ investment in quality or safety, but have only beliefs on the average quality of the industry. In addition, the outcome of the collective investment game of the firms may be stochastic since firms cannot control perfectly the technology or external...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833913

Optimal Capacity Adjustment by a Multiplant Firm

Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

The paper studies the effect of scale economies on the optimal capacity adjustment of a mutiplant firm. It is shown that with increasing economies of scale plants are ranked in decreasing order, after which the optimal choice is to scrap the largest one. On the contrary, if there are decreasing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570320

Merger Mechanisms

Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148

What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government’s choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781

On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502099

Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly

Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The seller’s problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller’s problem can always be found in an extreme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489607

Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a … designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423151

Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence

Vita, Giuseppe Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

since the year 2000, as a result of a change in the incentives for both private agents and bureaucrats. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423175

Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes

Carraro, Carlo; Buchner, Barbara - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

crucial to prioritise participation incentives for all countries, especially those without explicit or with insufficient … abatement targets. This paper offers a bottom-up game-theoretic perspective on participation incentives. Rather than focusing on … issue linkage, transfers or burden sharing as tools to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement, this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423177

Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen; Oreffice, Sonia - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

, where free-riding incentives are strong. Is a minimum participation rule a way to offset these free-riding incentives? Why …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423196