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Gender Issue and Water Management in the Mediterranean Basin, Middle East and North Africa

Minoia, Giulia - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This article aims to investigate some aspects of the social process related to water resources management and gender … relations. Given that gender and water management are interrelated issues exposed to a growing attention at the international … Technology for Sustainable Water Resources Management in the Mediterranean), a Co-ordination Action funded by the European …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385481

Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks

Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918

Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424

Bilateral Commitment

Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463

Optimal Conservation Policy Under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism

Corato, Luca Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421232

Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

Naghavi, Alireza; Tsai, Yingyi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635920

R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

Zikos, Vasileios - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965187

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489581

Matching Markets with Signals

Kushnir, Alexey - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008014

Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008019