Showing 1 - 10 of 142
small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of … the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of … have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008025
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network …’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891
neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which … players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327
Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic … selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008038
Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are … in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a … function of a network centrality measure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008039
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The … experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing … private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a “star” structure. With homogeneous agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423187
socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and … exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each … formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423231