2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in …

reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise … GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even “potentially …2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition. …

coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would …

to leave a coalition of the willing at any point in time. By means of a simple analytical model and of a numerical … integrated assessment model, we assess different coalition structures, and different minimum admission requirements. Our results … depending on the composition of the coalition of the willing. The policy turns out to be also rather efficient, with only minor …

investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay … in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several …