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Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China

Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of … corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within … a statistically significantly positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828390

The Consequences of Corruption: Evidence from China

Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption …. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic … development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465524

Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level

Torgler, Benno; Dong, Bin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level … empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the … effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965199

Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data

Torgler, Benno; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

Citizens are willing to abandon their short-term financial interest in free-riding considerably, if governments act in their interest, if procedures of the public decisions-making process are felt to be fair and if other fellow-citizens have to contribute also an adequate share to the community....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423218

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348

Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385389

The Political Economy of Privatization

Bortolotti, Bernardo; Pinotti, Paolo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. The empirical testing relies on a new political database with continuous and time-varying measures of the political-institutional setting, and of the partisan orientation of the executive. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385457

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Endogenous Price Mechanisms,Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence

Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385490