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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
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Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430
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Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013
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A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin
Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423099
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Free Trade Networks
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423216
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Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty
Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process –...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423226
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Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem
Lahiri, Somdeb - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423227
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Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234