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Ilkiliç, Rahmi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423231

Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms

Ilkiliç, Rahmi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008039

Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230917

Strategic Network Interdiction

Hong, Sunghoon - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131109

The Allocation of European Union Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles

Buchner, Barbara K.; Carraro, Carlo; Ellerman, A. Denny - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme … lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme … allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570294

The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531

The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Cian, Enrica De; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987244

Under-connected and Over-connected Networks

Hellmann, Tim; Buechel, Berno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

Finus, Michael; Rübbelke, Dirk T.G. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230868

Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Cian, Enrica De; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421243