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Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping

Cesi, Berardino; Albano, Gian Luigi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423150

Monopoly with Resale

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385437

All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers

Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570309

Merger Mechanisms

Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148

Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly

Manelli, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The seller’s problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller’s problem can always be found in an extreme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489607

Auction Design without Commitment

Vartiainen, Hannu - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570289

What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government’s choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781

On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502099

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833919

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385420