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A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, Mehmet B. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty …, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The … core is empty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385442

Understanding the Consumption Behaviors on Electric Vehicles in China - A Stated Preference Analysis

Wu, Libo; Li, Changhe; Qian, Haoqi; Zhang, ZhongXiang - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

This paper examines how the different characteristics of both electric vehicles themselves and the consumers would influence the consumption behavior on electric vehicles. Data collection is based on the questionnaire design using the orthogonal experimental method and large-scale stated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701054

Robust Control and Hot Spots in Dynamic Spatially Interconnected Systems

Brock, William; Xepapadeas, Anastasios - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

This paper develops linear quadratic robust control theory for a class of spatially invariant distributed control systems that appear in areas of economics such as New Economic Geography, management of ecological systems, optimal harvesting of spatially mobile species, and the like. Since this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828385

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385367

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Konishi, Hideo; Furusawa, Taiji - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

"intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990061

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

Zhao, Jingang - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423160

The ?-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240

Coalitional Matchings

Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423256

The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513

Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885