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A Public Finance Perspective on Climate Policy: Six Interactions That May Enhance Welfare
Siegmeier, Jan; Mattauch, Linus; Franks, Max; Klenert, David - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2015
Climate change economics mostly neglects sizeable interactions of carbon pricing with other fiscal policy instruments. Conversely, public finance typically overlooks the effects of future decarbonization efforts when devising instruments for the major goals of fiscal policy. We argue that such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268596
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Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392
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Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385389
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013
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Redistribution Effects of Energy and Climate Policy: The Electricity Market
Hirth, Lion; Ueckerdt, Falko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
policies redistribute wealth between consumers and producers, and within these groups. While redistribution is seldom the focus … the redistribution effects of two major electricity policies: support schemes for renewable energy sources, and CO2 … pricing. We find that the redistribution effects of both policies are large, and they work in opposed directions: while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603764
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Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium
Beltratti, Andrea - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
Socially responsible investment in analyzed in a general equilibrium context. This is important in order to understand the ultimate consequences of SRI on the decisions of economic agents. Building on models by Brock (1982) and Merton (1987), SRI is modelled as the choice to voluntarily give up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423067
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Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies policies
Canton, Joan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987245
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Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of Environmental Policies
Canton, Joan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected. Its objective function encompasses both social welfare and political contributions. Its only instrument is a pollution tax. In an open-economy context, we introduce an eco-industry in addition to lobbies of polluting firms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392538
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Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage
Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348
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Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904935