Similar Search Results

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423230

Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions … be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230854

Bicameralism and Government Formation

Merlo, Antonio; Diermeier, Daniel; Eraslan, Hülya - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423111

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in … prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent … elimination of dominated strategies and strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium are also tested. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048

Special Interests and Technological Change

Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423186

Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423254

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Weikard, Hans-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called "optimal sharing" which … stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570350

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last