Showing 1 - 10 of 171
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming … related either to accounting for a specific type of externality, or to dealing with the combinatorial nature of network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network … structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of … alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and … to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network … networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987229
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network …’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329
small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of … the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of … have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008025
connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043
neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which … players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327