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We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531
distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385438
schemes in order to influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990061
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition … structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502122
and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming … contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that … this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987229
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234