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We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234
the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385438
and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming … contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that … this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987229
schemes in order to influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990061