Showing 1 - 10 of 108
. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385500
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423198
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833919
bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891
This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public provision, the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904919
from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385341
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385381
distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385407