Similar Search Results

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068

Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level

Torgler, Benno; Dong, Bin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965199

Paths to Stability in Two-sided Matching with Uncertainty

Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the “name” but not the ”type” of the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904912

Coordination in Networks Formation: Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience

Galizzi, Matteo; Bernasconi, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat the one-way and the two-ways flow models, each for high and low link costs. The models show both multiple equilibria and coordination problems. We conduct experiments under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385417

The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency

Farvaque, Etienne; Mihailov, Alexander; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences in different economic systems. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents responding to economic incentives and transmitting their ideology...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320986

Applications and Interviews. A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search

Wolthoff, Ronald P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

Much of the job search literature assumes bilateral meetings between workers and firms. This ignores the frictions that arise when meetings are actually multilateral. I analyze the magnitude of these frictions by presenting an equilibrium job search model with an endogenous number of contacts....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421238

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more … informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833919

Environmental Catastrophes under Time-Inconsistent Preferences

Michielsen, Thomas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

I analyze optimal natural resource use in an intergenerational model with the risk of a catastrophe. Each generation maximizes a weighted sum of discounted utility (positive) and the probability that a catastrophe will occur at any point in the future (negative). The model generates time-...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671482

The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets

Hellman, Thomas; Perotti, Enrico - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

them widely to find a match. Yet as information is not excludable, shared ideas may be stolen, reducing incentives to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467316

How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in Networks

Golub, Benjamin; Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

on repeated averaging of neighbors' information and Markovian diffusion processes such as the Google random surfer model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008021