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Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and Corruption

Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a … political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights … equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828379

Oil Revenues, Ethnic Fragmentation and Political Transition of Authoritarian Regimes

Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541202

Clean or “Dirty” Energy: Evidence on a Renewable Energy Resource Curse

Gennaioli, Caterina; Tavoni, Massimo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector. Taking a political economy approach, we analyze the link between public support schemes for renewable energy and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. The insights...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320990

Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites

Akerman, Anders; Larsson, Anna; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320995

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348

Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385389

The Political Economy of Privatization

Bortolotti, Bernardo; Pinotti, Paolo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. The empirical testing relies on a new political database with continuous and time-varying measures of the political-institutional setting, and of the partisan orientation of the executive. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385457

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Endogenous Price Mechanisms,Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence

Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385490