Showing 1 - 10 of 10
The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promotedemployees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression tothe mean of the transitory component of ability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939753
This paper analyzes data from a novel field experiment designed to test the impact of twodifferent insurance products and a secret saving device on solidarity in risk-sharing groupsamong rural villagers in the Philippines. Risk is simulated by a lottery. Risk-sharing ispossible in solidarity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009486870
In this paper, we use unique data from a field experiment in the Swedish labor market toinvestigate how past and contemporary unemployment affect a young worker’s probability ofbeing invited to a job interview. In contrast to studies using registry/survey data, we havecomplete control over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009486983
The "common effect" model in program evaluation assumes that all treated individuals have the same impact from a program. Our paper contributes to the recent literature that tests and goes beyond the common effect model by investigating impact heterogeneity using data from the experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860640
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862319
Small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing countries.The rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these firms haveproductive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if given theopportunity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862578
Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may,first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose workeffort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for bothtasks as offered by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863219
We present results from a field experiment testing the gift-exchange hypothesis inside a treeplantingfirm paying its workforce incentive contracts. Firm managers told a crew of treeplanters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable topast planting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863220
juniors (under 30) and seniors (over 50) in both experiments conducted onsite with theemployees of two large firms and in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863328
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical dataon induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868022