Showing 1 - 10 of 17
This paper develops a framework for studying individuals ideas about what constitutes justcompensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay andthe principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master ofBusiness Administration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861085
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close agap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy atthe beginning of the tournament...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861537
This paper uses matched employer-employee panel data to show that individual jobsatisfaction is higher when other workers in the same establishment are better-paid. Thisruns contrary to a large literature which has found evidence of income comparisons insubjective well-being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861654
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within therealm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme,the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861675
On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861853
We investigate the use of performance appraisal (PA) in German Firms. First, we derivehypotheses on individual and job based determinants of PA usage. Based on arepresentative German data set on individual employees, we test these hypotheses and alsoexplore the impact of PA on performance pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862078
The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862318
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862319
We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly payworkers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find thatcompensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by theeconometrician) and unobserved productive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862774
We present results from a field experiment testing the gift-exchange hypothesis inside a treeplantingfirm paying its workforce incentive contracts. Firm managers told a crew of treeplanters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable topast planting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863220