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Tournaments and Office Politics:Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862319

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860221

Distributive Justice and CEO Compensation

Jasso, Guillermina; Meyersson Milgrom, Eva M. - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

This paper develops a framework for studying individuals ideas about what constitutes justcompensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay andthe principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master ofBusiness Administration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861085

Job Satisfaction and Co-worker Wages:Status or Signal?

Clark, Andrew E.; Kristensen, Nicolai; … - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

This paper uses matched employer-employee panel data to show that individual jobsatisfaction is higher when other workers in the same establishment are better-paid. Thisruns contrary to a large literature which has found evidence of income comparisons insubjective well-being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861654

Job Assignments under Moral Hazard:The Peter Principle Revisited

Koch, Alexander Karl; Nafziger, Julia - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862318

Performance Pay and Wage Inequality

Lemieux, Thomas; MacLeod, William Bentley; Parent, Daniel - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly payworkers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find thatcompensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by theeconometrician) and unobserved productive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862774

Direct Evidence on Income Comparisonsand their Welfare Effects

Senik, Claudia - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

This paper provides unheard direct evidence that comparisons exert a significant effect onsubjective well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types ofbenchmarks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861346

The Peter Principle: An Experiment

Dickinson, David L.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promotedemployees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression tothe mean of the transitory component of ability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939753

Gift Exchange within a Firm:Evidence from a Field Experiment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

We present results from a field experiment testing the gift-exchange hypothesis inside a treeplantingfirm paying its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863220

Sabotage in Tournaments:Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2009

behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in … thepresence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, whichmitigates the sabotage problem.[...] …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868022

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