Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin''s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo''s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social...

We introduce the concept of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (TUU-game). In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...

A model of belief dependent preferences in finite multi-stage games with observable actions isproposed. It combines two dissimilar approaches: incomplete information (Levine, 1998) andintentionality (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Incompleteinformation is important...

Inspired by the behavior in repeated guessing game experiments, we study adaptive play bypopulations containing individuals that reason with different levels of cognition. Individualsplay a higher order best response to samples from the empirical data on the history of play, wherethe order of...

Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple bestelements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting,strategy-proofness andmatching problems. We examine the notion of single-plateauedness in a choice-theoretic...

We study duopolistic competition in a differentiated market with firms setting prices and quantities, without explicitly imposing market clearing. Unlike the commonly adopted assumption of profit maximizing firms, we assume firm behavior to be shaped by a Darwinian dynamic: the less fitter firm...

We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that attach a rationalnumber to every event. We call these probability measures rational. We introduce the notion of arational belief hierarchy, where the first order beliefs are described by a rational measure overthe...

This paper studies a traditional monopolistic market of information goods in the presenceof an inherently strong peer-to-peer file-sharing network. Specifically, such a strongnetwork is made possible by a few fanatic users who selflessly contribute to the sharingof files. We find that the most...

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus ona new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibilitytheorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions, this...