In a mutual control structure agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples occur in the area of corporate governance firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, in particular by owning each others stocks. In this paper we formulate a general model for such situations....

A number of recent empirical studies of firm-level productivity (growth) have been concerned with establishing potential complementarity between multiple organizational design practices. These papers have drawn conclusions on basis of the effect of the interaction term between each possible pair...

The presence of synergies in recurrent procurement auctions leads to an exposure problem and asymmetries among bidders. We consider sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies in a setting with four bidders. In a series of experiments we compare the performance of the two pricing...

In this paper an infinite-horizon alternating-move Hotelling model in which consumers are uniformly distributed over the market is considered. In a Markov perfect equilibrium, a seller’s move in any period depends on the price the other seller is committed to. The analytic solution is given...

Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) derive entry thresholds (equilibrium numbers of firms) for local markets but do not investigate actual entry and exit flows. This paper investigates for thirteen Belgian retail and service industries whether markets with actual numbers of firms higher (lower) than the...

Co-determination refers to a set of rules and institutions which form an interlocking system and as such provide the unique structure of German corporate governance. This essay deals with the reasons responsible for bringing the structure about. In particular, the decision making process leading...

Competition in the emerging multimedia market currently focuses on setting standards for storing, retrieving, processing, (de)compressing, and transmitting information. Each multimedia system or architecture combines several standards, some proprietary. This paper uses selected insights from...

In this paper we show that in a private value setting first-price auctions can be preferred to second-price auctions. We consider a sequential auction of two objects with positive synergies and compare both auction formats. Although the second-price auction performs better in terms of efficiency...

In multi-unit (procurement) auctions winning multiple contracts can lead to cost advantages due to synergies. As an example one can think of procurement auctions where construction firms have returns to scale for investments in specialized equipments and workers that are required in large-scale...