We propose a new empirical approach to analyzing fiscal decentralization and apply it to Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relationships between the central government and provincial governments. In calculating budgetary revenue and expenditure shares, we include extra budgetary revenue and...

This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In...

This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In...

This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and redistribution in an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which growth is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The levels of public education and lump- sum financial transfers are determined by voting,...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which the dy- namics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash trans- fer in an overlapping generations model of a two-class society in which the dynamics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

This paper develops an overlapping-generations model including wage inequality within a generation and intra- and intergenerational resource reallocation via social security. Based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper focuses on the feedback mechanism between...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts their educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...