This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of public policy via individual decision-making. The paper extends the model in Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007, Journal of Economic Theory; henceforth HSZ) by generalizing the cost function of education and...

This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of redistribution policy via individual decision-making on education. For cases of high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the high-tax equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a large...

In this paper, we construct a simple dynamic two-party electoral competition model in which the degree of political instability is endogenously determined: which has never been studied so far. We consider the campaign contributions as stock variable which is gradually accumulated by both partyfs...

In this paper, we construct a simple dynamic two-party electoral competition model in which the degree of political instability is endogenously determined. We consider the campaign contributions as stock variable which is gradually accumulated by both partyfs direct investment and induced the...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism....

We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity, a...