This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In...

This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link between earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that an economy attains a unique, unskilled-majority equilibrium where unskilled, lowincome agents support a low, rather than a high,...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash trans- fer in an overlapping generations model of a two-class society in which the dynamics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which the dy- namics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while...

This paper presents a politico-economic model including a mutual link between earnings mobility and redistribution policy affected by human capital risk. A lowrisk economy produces multiple equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium with lower mobility and higher redistribution and a rich-majority...

This paper presents a politico-economic model including a mutual link between earnings mobility and redistribution policy affected by human capital risk. The model demonstrates that a low-risk economy produces multiple equilibria: an unskilled- majority equilibrium with lower mobility and higher...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

This paper develops an overlapping-generations model including wage inequality within a generation and intra- and intergenerational resource reallocation via social security. Based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper focuses on the feedback mechanism between...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts their educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

In this study, we ask why countries with similar labor market characteristics experience different occupational mobility levels and redistribution policies. We develop a politico-economic model that integrates occupational mobility affected by individual educational investments with voting on...