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Evidence on the Efficacy of School-Based Incentives for Healthy Living

Cuffe, Harold E.; Harbaugh, William T.; Lindo, Jason M.; … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

We analyze the effects of a school-based incentive program on children’s exercise habits. The program offers children an opportunity to win prizes if they walk or bike to school during prize periods. We use daily child-level data and individual fixed effects models to measure the impact of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393890

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

extrinsic incentives by the availability of non-monetary incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008676576

Bubbles and Incentives : An Experiment on Asset Markets

Robin, Stéphane; Straznicka, Katerina; Villeval, Marie … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858034

Ambiguous Incentives and the Persistence of Effort : Experimental Evidence

Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes … show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort. Intermittent incentives lead to a greater … persistence of effort, while continuous incentives entail exit as soon as payment stops. Randomness increases both earlier and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161033

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a means to tie executives? income to company performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in publicly owned companies. The overwhelming part of such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515805

Intermittent Reinforcement and the Persistence of Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

Whereas economists have made extensive studies of the impact of levels of incentives on behavior, they have paid little … attention to the effects of regularity and frequency of incentives. We contrasted three ways of rewarding participants in a real …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506223

Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2009

Most studies on the role of incentives on risk attitude report data obtained from within-subject experimental …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008471892

Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007

In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and … show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payo¤ but that it is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029818

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056867