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Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007

In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and … show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payo¤ but that it is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029818

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056867

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2004

experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that … the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112731

Do Women Prefer a Co-operative Work Environment?

Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

Are women disproportionately attracted to work environments where cooperation rather than competition is rewarded ? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme and a team-based payment scheme. We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318144

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056862

Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories

Villeval, Marie-Claire; Dickinson, David - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2004

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the “crowding-out” literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112716

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a means to tie executives? income to company performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in publicly owned companies. The overwhelming part of such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515805

Ambiguous Incentives and the Persistence of Effort : Experimental Evidence

Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes … show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort. Intermittent incentives lead to a greater … persistence of effort, while continuous incentives entail exit as soon as payment stops. Randomness increases both earlier and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161033

Intermittent Reinforcement and the Persistence of Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

Whereas economists have made extensive studies of the impact of levels of incentives on behavior, they have paid little … attention to the effects of regularity and frequency of incentives. We contrasted three ways of rewarding participants in a real …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506223