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Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858030

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037

The Dark Side of Competition for Status

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161035

Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive : Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460678

Mixing the Carrots with the Sticks : Third Party Punishment and Reward

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Mitchell, Helen - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

from an experiment measuring the demand for reward and punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties, separately and jointly. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858020

Moral Hypocrisy, Power and Social Preferences

Rustichini, Aldo; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858029

Inequity and Risk Aversion in Sequential Public Good Games

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2009

This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent's behavior in a sequential public good game depending on whether the agent is first or second mover. Theoretical predictions are based on heterogeneity of individuals in terms of social and risk preferences. We modelize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490699

Sen is not a capability theorist

Baujard, Antoinette; Gilardone, Muriel - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015

This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen’s idea of justice does not … consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant capability-centered view, Sen’s idea of justice is indeed … a commitment to a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251783

Aging and Attitudes Towards Strategic Uncertainty and Competition: An Artefactual Field Experiment in a Swiss Bank

Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie-Claire; Wasmer, Malgorzata - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858028

Dishonesty under scrutiny

Ven, Jeroen van de; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942938