Similar Search Results

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784

Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation

Joffily, Mateus; Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles N.; … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

We use skin conductance responses and self-reports of hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available. The application of sanctions activates a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913279

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy, Yannick; Marchand, Nadège - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2004

This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112727

Endogenous Entry, International Business Cycles, and Welfare

Auray, Stéphane; Eyquem, Aurélien - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

This paper examines if taking into account changes in the number of producers, or equivalently changes in the product variety space over the business cycle, helps to understand and replicate international business cycle facts. To this end, we develop a two-country model in which the economy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913278

Hierarchy, Coercion, and Exploitation : An Experimental Analysis

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Oechssler, Jörg; Shah, Anwar - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

between the power to coerce and exploitation in a laboratory experiment where a senior and a junior player interact repeatedly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161042

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037

Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We provide experimental evidence of workers’ ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers’ discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers’ performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858024

Aging and Attitudes Towards Strategic Uncertainty and Competition: An Artefactual Field Experiment in a Swiss Bank

Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie-Claire; Wasmer, Malgorzata - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858028

Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858030

Bubbles and Incentives : An Experiment on Asset Markets

Robin, Stéphane; Straznicka, Katerina; Villeval, Marie … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and trading activity in experimental asset markets. We compare i) a no-bonus treatment based on Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) ; ii) a short-term bonus treatment in which bonuses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858034