We investigate how intensive should be the monitoring effort and how the reaction of the patentholder may influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game we show that even if the penalty paid by the infringer and the settlement cost are high, the patentholder may decide to choose a...

This paper considers the repetition of a finite two person game when each player knows an upper bound on the length of the game, but assigns a positive probability to his opponent overestimating the length of the game. It is shown that with sufficiently little discounting, any payoff vector that...

In this paper, we develop a continuous time duopoly model of irreversible investment under uncertainty, where each player may learn about the profitability of an investment by observing the experience of his rival, as well as some costless background information. We show that the resulting war...

An elementary proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium is given for economies where the weak axiom of revealed preference or the gross substitution property hold. It is shown by an induction argument that in these cases, the problem is reduced to the question of the existence of an...

Bertrand argued that price would be driven down to marginal cost even with only two firms in the market. Chamberlin, by introducing product differentiation, argued that price will exceed marginal cost even when there are many firms. Thus product differentiation resolves the "Bertrand Paradox"....