We propose a simple model of competition for the production of energy between a thermal station and an hydrostation. We show analytically and geometrically that, despite its static characteristics, the output from the thermal station is determined by the intertemporal specifications of costs and...

We investigate how intensive should be the monitoring effort and how the reaction of the patentholder may influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game we show that even if the penalty paid by the infringer and the settlement cost are high, the patentholder may decide to choose a...

Under a subscriber-supported television, specification should be viewed as a multidimensional problem. First, there is the traditional question how to allocate a number of channels -carried either by cable or satellite- among different program types. Second, there is the issue of packaging. What...

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian...

The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information...

Pollution is a public bad. In neoclassical models, when economic agents face environmental externalities, individual rationality is not sufficient to create optimality. By supposing that consumers have an altruistic behavior, we reduce the non-optimality range and we find that a monopoly is...

We analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. We show that whether the products are substitutes or complements, these exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if...