This paper examines the effect of moral hazard on public health insurance contract. It models primary prevention in a two period model with classification risk. Agent’s preferences appear to play an important role in the optimal determination of preventive effort and insurance between...

We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this by using studies of traditional and business-format-franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales- force-integration...

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...