The paper reports on experiments designed to compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods problems. One mechanism rewards and penalizes deviations from the average contribution of the other agents to the public good (tax-subsidy mechanism). Another mechanism allows agents...

This paper addresses the impact of violent conflict on social capital, as measured by citizen anticipation in community groups defined for four activity types: governance, social service, infrastructure development and risk-sharing. Combining household panel data from Indonesia with conflict...

A student’s future log-wage is given by the sum of a skill premium and a random personal “ability” term. Students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. We assume first that universities are...

This paper proposes a model which intends to analyse the alternative between discrimination and mutualisation in insurance. We suppose there exists an observable (but initially hidden)variable, that predicts the level of risk of an individual. This variable can be observed through a testing...

This paper studies within a dynamical model how decentralized individuals happen to elect non-proprietary standard. The issue is coordination because the individual benefit of adoption depends on whether other agents elect to adopt the same standard. It shows that whenthere are increasing...

En considerant que l'une des caracteristiques des problemes environnementaux est le niveau d'incertitudequi les accompagne, nous proposons d'etudier les effets de ces incertitudes sur les comportements de choix de portefeuille et d'epargne des agents. Nous montrons alors qu'a l'equilibre...

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.