The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to contruct approximations...

Properties of an average voting rule - the outcome being some weighted average of votes – are investigated, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. The unique average voting outcome is characterized with a median formula which depends on the voters’ preferred...

The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability....

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potential allows for a characterisation of such an equilibrium.

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...