Restricting attention to quasi-linear utility functions, we examine in the paper the distributive incidence of income taxes used to finance the production of a single public good.

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.

Properties of an average voting rule - the outcome being some weighted average of votes – are investigated, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. The unique average voting outcome is characterized with a median formula which depends on the voters’ preferred...

This paper develops a dynamic model wherin production generates pollution that is viewed as a public bad by consumers. There are two types of consumers: those who are altruist a la Barro-Becker and leave bequests to their children and those who are pure life-cyclers. Both types of consumers...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can volutary contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution activities...

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to contruct approximations...

We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively separable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equalization payment scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive equalization payment scheme is defined as a list of...

This paper provides a normative appraisal of the Canadian equalization transfers system. For that sake, the two-dimensional dominance criteria introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon(RES, 1982) are used to compare the distributions of private and public good before and after equalization...