Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly within the household: an individual is systematically disadvantaged in the intra-household allocation. If an improvement of...

Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly. Individuals are split into two types, the dominant and the dominated. We look for conditions under which welfare and...

When equivalence scales are used to compute the well-being of individuals, two possible weighting methods of the different household types have been proposed, the first one resorts to the family size and the second to the equivalence scale itself. The latter is criticized on the ground that it...

We investigate the problem of how to make welfare comparisons of income distributions hen a population allocation problem (how a population should be optimally divided over families for given resources) adds to the usual income allocation problem. Pro-family and anti-family stances are...

We present a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure,only pairwise meetings can occur when some of them are not permitted.The present extension is a new one and in particular it is di .erent from the Myerson value,from the position value,and from a previous...

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...

In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule...

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).

The aim of this paper is to present an approach to the middleman problem in the context of cooperative games when communication between players is graph-restricted. We consider a set of three axioms: linearity, dummy player and independence of non connected coalitions. These axioms are generally...