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Strategic communication networks
Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2008
this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who … coordination motive and the prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930223
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Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations
Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2011
We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent) ideal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930240
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Strategic Communication Networks
Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2009
close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738542
Cover Image
Strategic communication networks
Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2008
this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who … coordination motive and the prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025532