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Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud
Picard, Pierre - HAL - 2012
approaches to insurance fraud that have been developped in the literature, namely the costly state verification and the costly … state falsification. Under costly state verification, the insurer can verify claims at some cost. Claims' verification may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821286
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Monetary incentives in the loss domain and behavior toward risk: An experimental comparison of three reward schemes including real losses
Etchart-Vincent, Nathalie; L'Haridon, Olivier - HAL - 2011
In the loss domain, both practical and ethical considerations rule out the systematic use of an incentive-compatible procedure involving real losses. The experimental study presented here aims at investigating whether some easier-to-implement procedure could be adequately used. For that purpose,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025585
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On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
Grabisch, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter - HAL - 2014
A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784118
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On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
Grabisch, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter - HAL - 2014
A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025926
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On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
Grabisch, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter - HAL - 2014
A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775866