This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment...

This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment...

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. The punishment is costly for both the players distributing and those receiving the...

Cette expérience sur les mécanismes de contribution volontaire à un bien public utilise une fonction de paiement qui définit l'optimum de Pareto à l'intérieur de l'espace stratégique des contributions. Deux optima sont comparés. L'un est défini à 30% de la contribution individuelle,...