This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of...

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

This paper addresses the two-way implication between punctuality level of public transport and commuter behavior. We consider a modal competition between public transport and an alternative mode. Commuters may choose different strategies to minimize their journey cost. In particular, when the...

This paper addresses the two-way implication between punctuality level of public transport and commuter behavior. We consider a modal competition between public transport and an alternative mode. Commuters may choose different strategies to minimize their journey cost. In particular, when the...

We use skin conductance responses and self-reports of hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available. The application of sanctions activates a...