This paper studies how Oates' trade-off between centralized and decentralized public good provision is affected by changes in households' mobility. We show that an increase in household mobility favors centralization, as it increases competition between jurisdictions in the decentralized regime...

Building on recent contributions to the New Economic Geography literature, this paper analyses the relation between asymmetric market size, trade integration and business income tax differentials across countries. First, relying on a foot-loose capital model of tax competition, we illustrate...

The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we...

In this methodological paper, we prove that the key tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988), extended to asymmetric regions, possesses a Nash equilibrium under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature : goods are supposed to be normal ;...

In this paper, we extend the stansard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to...

We investigate the impact of trade liberalization upon the taxation of capital within a context of labor market rigidities. Using a model of trade and location, we show that labor market imperfections not only strengthen tax competition but also affect the relationship between trade integration...

Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. We study a tax game between a large country and a tax haven modeling heterogenous monopolistic firms, which can shift profits abroad. We shows that a higher degree of firm heterogeneity (a...

This paper explores how trade integration influences the decision by national governments to bailout manufacturing firms. We develop a 2-country model of generalized oligopoly with heterogenous firms and trade costs. High-cost firms are eligible for a bailout while low-cost firms are profitable....

Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are...