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Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2009
The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401083
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Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection
Teyssier, Sabrina - HAL - 2007
In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We define a separating equilibrium that explains the co-existence of multiple payment schemes in firms. We show that a tournament provides strong incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788937
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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts
Teyssier, Sabrina - HAL - 2008
This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788967
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2004
concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788998
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790614
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Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2008
scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance pay. Social motivation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790841
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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791004
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay - An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2004
concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791578
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Effort Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008792126
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Task Organization, Human Capital and Wages in Moroccan Exporting Firms
Muller, Christophe; Nordman, Christophe J. - HAL - 2013
We conduct a case study of the linkages of task organization, human capital accumulation and wages in Morocco, using … by our estimates: task organization influences on-the-job training that affects wages. Beyond sector and gender … textile sector and for well-educated workers. Finally, task organization and on-the-job training are found to affect wages. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933817