This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets. It shows that firms' incentives to vertically integrate other firms depends on the competitive environment.

This paper illustrates the effect of market size on the decision of whether or not firms should vertically integrate or disintegrate. We use a model of two successive stages of production with Cournot competition in each stage. In this model, firms choose to specialize (either upstream or...

This paper argues that an adequate approach to the firm should be able to accommodate the complexities of actual firm development. The latter is conceptualized in terms of three general stages: prime movers or drivers of change, change processes, and change attractors. Furthermore, any...

This paper studies the potential effects of vertical integration on downstream firms' incentives to innovate. Interacting efficiently with a supplier may require information exchanges, which raises the concern that sensitive information may be disclosed to rivals. This may be particularly...

In international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered...

Stemming from politically given market imperfections in a tradable permits system, this paper develops a Stackelberg game with two types of non-cooperative agents to describe how a large -potentially dominant- agent may exercise market power at the expense of a competitive fringe. In a dynamic...