En 2001, le groupe français PSA Peugeot Citroën et le groupe japonais Toyota Motor Corporation décident de coopérer pour développer et produire de petits véhicules, principalement destinés au marché européen. La coopération se traduit par la constitution d'une joint venture localisée...

This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a welfarist social planner when households with identical utility functions for non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It...

This paper studies selection rules i.e. the procedures committees use to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. The main ingredient of the model is that committee members are uncertain about their final preferences at the selection stage: they only know the probability that they will...

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...

In three related papers, we consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents may observe private information signals, form private anticipations and face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium,...

This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more...

We introduce a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and incomplete financial markets, where default is allowed and agents face in case they do default an utility penalty, which is their own private information. In this setting, if agents have heterogeneous characteristics they...

Our earlier papers [2,3,4,5,6] had extended to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory [1,7,10], under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study its...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete nominal-asset markets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre [3] introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information setting the classical concepts of symmetric information. In...