Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 84
Cover Image
On the spike in hazard rates at unemployment benefit expiration: The signalling hypothesis revisited
Decreuse, Bruno; Kazbakova, Elvira - HAL - 2008
We revisit the signalling hypothesis, whereby potential employers use the duration of unemployment as a signal as to the productivity of applicants. We suggest that the quality of sucha signal is very low when the unemployed receive unemployment benefits: individuals have good reasons to remain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793679
Cover Image
MORAL HAZARD IN DYNAMIC INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION RISK AND PREPAYMENT
Bourlès, Renaud - HAL - 2008
period model with classification risk. Agents' preferences appear to play an important role in the determination of … preventive effort and prepayment. If absolute prudence is larger that absolute risk aversion, moral hazard increases prepayment … of premium and classification risk. This highlights a tradeoff between prevention and prepayment that arises from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794365
Cover Image
Moral hazard and risk-sharing: risk-taking as an incentive tool
Belhaj, Mohamed; Bourlès, Renaud; Deroïan, Frédéric - HAL - 2010
We examine how moral hazard impacts risk-sharing when risk-taking can be part of the mechanism design. In a two …-agent model with binary effort, we show that moral hazard always increases risk-taking (that is the amount of wealth invested in a … risky project) whereas the effect on risk-sharing (the amount of wealth transferred between agents) is ambiguous. Risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794403
Cover Image
Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2012
search intensity of risk-averse workers (the agents) is not observed by the risk-neutral insurance agency (the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647516
Cover Image
Regular moral hazard economies
Chassagnon, Arnold - HAL - 2007
state of nature insurance model, with a risk neutral principal, a risk averse agent and separable costs. Typically, in such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738744
Cover Image
Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance
Gardiol, Lucien; Geoffard, Pierre-Yves; Grandchamp, Chantal - HAL - 2005
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738866
Cover Image
Sharing aggregate risks under moral hazard
Demange, Gabrielle - HAL - 2008
This paper analyzes the efficient design of insurance schemes in the presence of aggregate shocks and moral hazard. The population is divided into groups, the labour force in different sectors for instance. In each group, individuals are ex ante identical but are subject to idiosyncratic shocks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738915
Cover Image
Heterogeneous Banking Efficiency : Allocative Distortions and Lending Fluctuations
Duprey, Thibaut - HAL - 2013
This paper is a first attempt to connect the heterogeneity in bank efficiency with lending fluctuations and allocation efficiency: there is a trade-off between the two in the presence of heterogeneity in bank monitoring efficiency. The mechanism at hand is twofold. (a) First the rent extracted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739116
Cover Image
Double moral hazard and the energy efficiency gap
Giraudet, Louis-Gaëtan; Houde, Sébastien - HAL - 2014
We investigate how moral hazard problems can cause sub-optimal investment in energy efficiency, a phenomenon known as the energy efficiency gap. We argue that such problems are likely to be important for home energy retrofits, where both the seller and the buyer can take hidden actions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821504
Cover Image
Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - HAL - 2012
. Finally, even in the special case where search intensity is zero close to retirement, perfect risk-sharing across unemployment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821519